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OPPOSING EXPERT TESTIMONY
W. El asberg
In its sociological aspects this article offers a systematic criticism
of many somewhat monomanic suggestions of lopsided reformers. But
besides, it includes systematically developed positive proposals. As to
the latter it is important to bear in mind that they refer, not to a mil-
lennium, but to these United States in the year 1945.
The author is a well known psychiatrist and expert witness in New
York City, who frequently contributes to this Journal.-EDITOR.
"Law is through and through a social phenomenon ... Social facts
are not facts taken to mean something done, finished, or over with ...
Their conflicts are proof of a vital genuineness."--John Dewey in My
Philosophy of Law.'
Definitions
There are, broadly speaking, two groups of definitions of
the expert in court. The first relates to his knowledge; the
second limits him as one appointed to serve in court for a fee
and as one to whom certain procedural rules apply.
A definition of the first type is the following: The expert is
one -ho transmits knowledge, or applies it, or gets at the facts,
or unearths them, or demonstrates them, or does any of these
things or all of them with skill and thoroughness.2 A defi-
nition in the second type: one who legally, on the order of
proper judicial authority and under oath, applies his knowl-
edge to unearth and demonstrate facts, and/or to interpret
them for the particular purposes of a trial. The latter type of
definition prevails in the continental literature. It is in keep-
ing with the fact that the expert, whether or not he is intro-
duced by the parties, may function only after the court appoints
him and only after a special expert's oath3 has been adminis-
tered to him. The American Law Institute steers the middle
course between these two definitions, thus: "Expert witness de-
fined: A witness is an expert witness and is qualified to give
expert testimony if the judge finds that to perceive, know, or
understand the matter concerning which the witness is to tes-
tify requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or training,
and that the witness has the requisite special knowledge, skill,
I Boston, Boston Law Book Co., 1941.2 Rogers, Expert Testimony, 2nd ed., 1891, calls an expert anyone
who is skilled in any art, trade or profession, and possessed of peculiar
knowledge concerning the same. We object that this is not the definition
of the expert in court, but in any relation in life. Cf. W. Eliasberg,
Psychology and the Administration of the Law, Berlin, Heymann, 1932,
p. 86 ff.
3 In the continental litigation and trial, as often as not, the experts
are chosen by the court. They may not be rejected by the parties, who,
however, may question them through the presiding judge. Cf. G.
Aschaffenberg, Synopsis of the Position of the Experts in Court in West-
ern Europe and in the United States. (Mimeographed lecture at the
99th annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Detroit,
1943.)
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experience, or training."- This definition would be complete
if the following words were added: "and if the judge, upon
such finding, appoints the witness in the way described by the
law, to be an expert."
Let us see some examples of the different functions of the
knowledge of an expert witness in court. The judge may want
to know what is the present knowledge about schizophrenia in
general; or he may ask whether the defendant at the time of
the commission of an alleged crime was conscious of acting con-
trary to the law or whether he was laboring under any and what
delusions.5 When the judge asks such questions his definition
of expert witness is evidently of the second type. It is so, like-
wise, whenever he is seeking general rules and when he wants
to know whether individual data are covered by a rule.
Getting at the facts is one of the most important achieve-
ments of the expert. Poisons may be imperceptible to the naked
eye and the other senses. The expert will prove or exclude
their presence. He will have to make the second step also, viz.,
make the facts demonstrable to the common sense of the lay
judge of fact. It is the task of the expert to demonstrate the
facts. It is his task also to persuade the jury of the existence
of the facts, i.e., to convince them. But it is not his task to
impose upon them, to trick them into a certain theory, to mar-
shal all his facts artfully in such a manner as counsel may do.
This difference, slim as it may seem at first blush, has im-
portant consequences. If the expert claims to be possessed of
facts which he cannot find ways to demonstrate to the common
sense of the jury, but which he can only foist or force upon
them, he must not be admitted in court. This holds for any
expert or occultist who tells the court or implies that he pos-
sesses and can demonstrate certain facts only because he has
peculiar qualities or powers that laymen do not have: powers
or qualities that have been "given" to him. It is not admissi-
ble that there is any knowledge that is accessible only to the
super-normal or to privileged votaries. If there were such
knowledge the trier of fact would either have to believe it
blindly or reject it. In other words, the decision of fact would
be taken away from the trier of fact and given to the expert.6
If the question is raised as to whether a certain deed has been
committed by the defendant in a state of temporary confusion,
the expert might say that the habitual character of the perpe-
trator is sufficient to connect him with the act. This would be
circumstantial evidence, inasmuch as a certain characterological
4 Rule 402 of the "Model Code of Evidence," American Law Insti-
tute, 1942.
5 Question 5 put to the judges in M'Naghten's case in 1843.
6 Cf. W. Eliasberg, Op. cit., p. 88; L. L. Rosenthal: Development of
the Use of Expert Testimony. Law and Contemporary Problems, vol.
II, no. 4, 1935, p. 4 ff. s p g-10: The expert and the lay witnesses.
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type is brought into close connection with the case at hand.
As is well known, the so-called hypothetical question has been'
developed to offset this danger. Under no circumstances should
the expert's demonstration of general facts of knowledge
amount to a a statement of guilt or include it or, indeed, anti-
cipate any finding of the jury or the court.7
Differences among experts may arise at any point in the trial.
They may differ in their knowledge, in the way they apply
knowledge to the facts, and in their skill and tact in demonstra-
tion. Beyond such individual differences, basic arguments may
arise among experts, between the expert and the court, or be-
tween the expert and opposing counsel, as to what is fact and
what is opinion. Rather, in our present procedure, one expert
may find himself in no position to answer "yes" or "no"
whereas another may. The former may feel that what is hypo-
thetically presented to him as fact is of no factual nature at all.
Nor will admission in evidence, or, indeed, the determination
of fact by the jury help him in his embarrassment. He still
might not feel that he is dealing with a fact. Such a predica-
ment may arise when the plea of insanity has been entered by
the defense in mitigation or as reason for postponing trial.8
"Worse yet, an expert who has not examined or even seen the
defendant at all is competent to testify in answer to a hypo-
thetical question . . . Moreover, the witness may not himself
believe in the truth of the facts assumed."9
In unearthing, and demonstrating what is pertinent to the
case at hand, changes of the facts themselves may occur. The
embarrassment of the expert witness in such a case is identical
with that of scholars who differ in their description and evalua-
tion of historical facts. Both expert witnesses and historians
deal with facts that branch out into the social world, in other
words with social facts, which as John Dewey said, are activi-
ties; meaning that they are of an intrinsically changing nature
and by no means wholly static and definitely established.
Very often the sources from which experts derive their
knowledge may account for differences. One who deals pro-
fessionally with numbers is more articulate about statistics, 10
while another, who is used to analysis and to adaptation of
theories to individual cases will dwell on the particulars. The
former, keeping aloof, as it were, from the individual case, will
take no keen interest in the verification of an item at hand.
7 See part 11.
8 Cf. H. Weihofen: "An Alternative to the Battle of the Experts."
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. II, No. 4, 1935.
9 H. Weihofen: Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law. New York,
Commonwealth Fund, 1933.
10 as the all-embracing business ideology of the twenties, with its
glorification of efficiency, mass production, and outputs, made inroads
into the "business" of the experts? We submit this as a suitable topic*for the studies of an analyst or historian of modern culture.
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Consequently, while the former will talk of probabilities, the
latter focusses on reasonable truth.
Often, but by no means always, differences between individ-
ualist and collectivist experts coincide with the experience of
the practitioner or specialist in private practice and that of the
head of a large hospital or institute.
There are differences not based on the sources of knowledge
or on individual training. Who is the retainer of the expert?
In discussing the question, we are dealing only with the situa-
tion as it is observed at present. In the second part of this
paper we will show that this has been a bone of contention and
that many reformers have picked upon this question alone.
As it is now, there are "testifiers" for the plaintiff 1 on the
one hand, and experts for the defense on the other. A situation
has developed in which the more experienced and respectable
doctors take sides with the companies, and the younger, less
experienced, ambitious, and often greedy expert, testifies for
the complainant. It stands to reason that this situation is not
favorable for fact-finding.
The differences mentioned so far have their roots in what
precedes the trial; in the expert's techniques, beliefs, mores,
customs, folkways, affiliations, etc. But the "jeer, sneer and
leer,"'1 2 a to and fro of attacks and counter-attacks; of fanning
and rooting and intrigue among all those before the bar-these
are the roots of an atmosphere which is hostile to the ideals
which are often found engraved upon the pediments of our
court buildings: "The Place of Justice is a Sacred Place."
The relationship between the lay witness and the expert
who meet one another for the first time in the courtroom, de-
velops also in that atmosphere. How should the expert ap-
proach the testimony of the lay witness? How should he
handle the facts which he learns from the testimony? He, of
course, need not assume, before the trier of fact has explicitly
stated it, that these are legal facts, and that he is not involved
in the problem of prima facie evidence. The main problems
which the expert has to deal with are the following: 1. To
evaluate the testimony or to judge the witness in borderline
cases, i.e., the child witness, the psychopathic witness, the psy-
chotic, the deaf-mute, the feeble-minded, the senile, the men-
struating woman, and other such witnesses. 2. To measure
the testimony against established theories. These are the more
important cases. Many contemporary theories that confront
the court are based on statistics. The expert should examine
the contingency of the theory by assuming as long as possible
1J. W. Courtney. "Address to the Graduating Class." Boston Med-
ical and Surgical Journal, January 3rd, 1916.
12 p. E. Elliott and R. Spillman. "Medical Testimony in Personal
Injury Cases." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. II, No. 4, 1935.
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that the testimony contains something which the witness knows
from his own experience, and that such facts cannot be super-
seded by theoretical and general knowledge. In certain cases,
however, theory has priority over what our senses do not reveal
to us. For example, we believe the earth is a ball although the
eye does not show it so. But upon closer examination it is not
perception that the theory contradicts. Theory is based upon
perception. What the theory discredits is the primitive disk-
theory of the earth which was based on those same perceptions.
This then, is what the expert should do. While accepting the
witness' perceptions as long as possible, he should see what
theory they fit into best.
In a recent case, three witnesses, all of them employees of the same com-
pany, told the court that they had seen the claimant walk upstairs and
had not seen him come down. So he must have fallen from the roof.
The company was not liable to damage for falling from the roof. The
claimant maintained he had been bruised when a crate fell from the roof,
a height of twenty feet. The expert, by applying a simple physical for-
mula, computed the force which must have been brought to bear upon
the skull as that of an eighty-three horsepower automobile travelling
at a speed of twenty miles an hour against a stone wall. It is clear that
from such an impact the claimant must have sustained severe fractures
not only of the skull but also of the limbs, etc. Being grazed by the
crate while in a standing position was the much more probable assump-
tion because the forces in that case were much smaller.' This is a case
where the expert was forced to put aside the witness' testimony. It is
at the same time a case in which the witnesses, all employees of the same
company, gave only circumstantial evidence.
Reforming the Practice of Expert Witnesses
"What is to be done about it? In no field have there been
so many super-serviceable and ill-considered proposals for re-
form."'1 3 Though their authors may be subjectively honest,
many of the suggestions from both medical men and other ex-
perts on the one hand, and lawyers on the other, are thinly-
veiled nostrums that can not be intended to serve the truth.
Experts who have chafed under the "debunking" attacks of
opposing counsel would like to take away from the parties the
right to retain experts of their own choice. Procedurally, they
would exempt experts from the usual cross-examination. They
would allow the parties to address them only through the
court.14 Some have gone to such lengths as to suggest juries
of experts for the decision of certain complex facts. They
take the question of insanity away from the lay jury and settle
it by competent experts and require the lay jury to accept their
judgment as final. According to these suggestions, there would
be a pre-trial jury, an expert bench, a suggestion which is in
opposition to the letter of the constitution.
13 L. P. Stryker. Courts and Doctors. New York, Macmillan, 1939.
14 P. E. Elliott and R. Spillman, op. cit.
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This is somewhat reminiscent of the suggestions that have been devel-
oped in the last century for the reform of the industrial society and the
healing of the festering wounds of the class struggle. Each reformer
thought that his suggestion was a panacea.15
Each particular reform presupposes for its success a degree of
authority, interest, enthusiasm and devotion to the public wel-
fare, which are, however, less determined by character and
other purely psychological factors than by the social situation.
The basic concepts for understanding human behavior in civi-
lized life are social role, motivation and attitude, much more
than character, individual psychological differences, heredity,
biopsychological determinants, etc.
The concept of the r6le is taken from the play. An actor
must have an understanding of his r6le; he must embody it,
and act it out. It is given him more or less ready-made as
contained in the play book. It is up to him to transfer him-
self and to grow into it. In fact his success will depend on how
well he can do that. He may specialize in certain types of
r6les, which means that other r6les will no longer be acceptable
to him. Perfect acting is built on the assumption that several
r6les will cooperate. There is no real play and no r6le where
one star outshines all the other actors. If there is no play, the
chances are that the audience will take it amiss. It will show
in the box office returns, and after a week it will be a flop.
Thus it can be demonstrated to all those who should have co-
operated and did not that it is their own interest they have
harmed. In certain crises, enthusiasm and religious devotion
will keep the cast together, but on the whole these are rare ex-
ceptions and much more frequently egotistic interests will have
to be appealed to.
The perfect play is an interplay. To understand this the
actor will be helped only very little by general ethics. Altru-
ism does not make for good acting. On the whole, the actor
who. plays noble characters will not become a noble character
in private life, nor should you identify your gentle neighbor
with the villain he is used to playing on the stage. He himself
takes it for granted that all villainous tendencies are removed
from his personality together with the make-up. The actor is
a peaceful citizen, who after a more or less thorough prepara-
tory training, wants to make a living by acting.
Experts also are people, who after a certain training and
after having been. invested with degrees, diplomas, or any other
proof of their professional experience, want to be called upon
to play the r6le of men in the know. They are good or bad
actors according to their talent, training, character, understand-
ing of the r6le and the situation, their ability to cooperate, etc.
15 Cf. W. Eliasberg, "The Challenge of the Social Neuroses." J.
Nerv. and Men. Dis., 1941, 94, 676-87.
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Reforming the actor and the expert, if need be, cannot be
done as, under certain antiquated theories, we have tried to
proceed with the criminal. Jailing a criminal and leaving it to
him to make the best of it, is a crude but definite change in
the situation. Delving into his character and his neurosis is
another way. These two things have been done so far with not
much interplay. The reforms aimed at the experts have preg-
nantly resembled those of the criminalists.
Men are all wicked; experts are men. Ergo, only much mor-
alizing will help - is one type of a crude social-psychological
syllogism.
Call them in the right way, don't ask them silly hypothetical questions;
strengthen their authority, and they will not only behave, but serve the
purposes of justice to the best of their knowledge - this
is another apriorism. What the reforms should be at present,
can be developed only after a thorough sociological and social-
psychological, and legal analysis of the present situation.
Panoramic View
The expert, then, called in by a party has to promote the
purposes of justice by offering his knowledge, that is based on
facts, and should lead to other facts. He intends to make a
living for himself in this and related ways. Litigation and trial
in our system are based on several principles which it is not
always easy to bring into harmony. There is the principle of
material scientific truth which, however, is limited very defi-
nitely by the principle of the disposition of the parties and the
law of evidence. The expert may not claim the absolute valid-
ity of scientific truth and under our procedural laws nobody
holds a position above the parties. While the authoritative
expert will be able to pass cross examination, such examination
cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt, the facts on which
the expert's opinion itself is based. To -get at the real back-
ground of the expert's answers, the analysis as outlined above
is necessary. It is often surprising to see how such an analysis,
performed by a trained mind, changes the apparent contradic-
tions into a panoramic view. One might suggest a reform of
the law that requires the judge to charge the jury. Such
charges should contain an analysis of the expert's opinions.
The jurors should be told that the finding of facts, if based
on experts' opinions, must proceed by combining different
aspects of the testimony. Such an analysis must be strictly
on the analytical level and should avoid the mere grading of
opinions. However, the fact that there are differences be-
tween the experts can not and should not be denied. Who
is to judge such differences? In the continental procedure, an
attempt has been made to solve this problem by giving an offi-
cial position to certain experts, i.e., by appointing them irrevo-
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cably, as federal judges are appointed in this country, and by
excluding the appointment by the parties of the expert in the
case at hand. The experiences with the so-called Gerichtsaerzte
were not encouraging. As office-holders for life they felt no
stimulus to keep abreast of scientific development. There was
no competition between the Gerichtsaerzte and the free lance
experts of the parties, but the chances were that the latter,
called in on account of their well-earned reputation, were by
far more serviceable in the pursuit of the truth. In certain
cases, in which particular equipment is necessary which is not
easily accessible to private persons, e.g., in coroners' inquests
and post mortem autopsy, the examiner may have to be a
court's physician.' 6 Upon the former point every one who has
witnessed the continental development will agree.17 Does this
mean that the Anglo-Saxon system is unimpeachable? Of
course not. But it may prove that a sociologically wrong re-
form does not hold out hope of real improvement.
The competitive system, which is the life-blood of democ-
racy, must be preserved in our field. Democratic competition
must be regulated, however. Democratically regulated com-
petition is in keeping with democratically regulated free in-
itiative 8 ; with increasingly limited freedom of choice; limits
of property rights; in short, with the multiplied encroachments
on what had been the sphere of liberty in the older rdgime.
The socalled liberal professions have been regulated by
autonomous professional 'organizations since antiquity.19 The
interference from the larger political organizations, the police
or the state, has continually increased with both the principles
Is Max Hirschberg, in his paper "Wrongful Convictions", Rocky
Mountain Law Review, 1940, 13, 20-47, has listed cases where the "court's
physician" had grossly erred in overlooking findings and had thus con-
tributed to verdicts of murder in the first degree, where on appeal only
manslaughter through negligence was found.
17 In addition to the above-mentioned objections, one might think
of a danger that a new, irremovable, and fatefully backward bureau-
cracy was created, and thus in a new field anti-democratic forces were
- strengthened. It is well known that in the interval period the judicial
bureaucracy opposed the German Republic. Cf. H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen
und Wert der Democratie, Tubingen, 1929, 2nd ed.
18 C. E. Merriam. The New Democracy and the New Despotism,
N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1939.
19 Cf. T. Loewenfeld. Inaestimabilitat und Honoricrung der artes
liberales nach R6mischem Recht. Festgabe der Milnchen Juristenfacultdt
zum Doctorjubilaum des Herr Geheimen rats und Professors, Dr. J. J.
W. v. Planck, Mfinchen, 1887; a classical investigation based on pro-
found knowledge which has greatly influenced the development of the
theory of the liberal professions. Cf. also, S. Feuchtwanger, Die Freien
Berufe, im besondern: die Anwaltschaft. Miinchen, Duncker u. Hum-
blot, 1922; Esther L. Brown, Lawyers and the Prcmotion of Justice,
New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1938; W. Eliasberg, Textbook of
Propaganda, Brno, Rohrer, 1936, ch. 15; the same author, Physician and
Propaganda, Vienna, Saturn Verlag, 1936; H. Laski; The Limitations
of the Expert, London, Fabian Tracts, No. 235, 1931.
It is the last two points, outlined above, in which the member of the
profession who is an incumbent for life is obviously less interested.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
of democracy and of the omnipotent state.20 In the democra-
des, however, other factors than the clamping down of state
rule on the professional organizations have proven valuable.
In every organization there is a tendency to over-do the in-
group ties and to overlook the interests of the consumers of the
services. In a democracy, however, this tendency is likely to
be corrected in the long run, while in a totalitarian form of
professional organization the redressing forces, both for lack of
information and a fulcrum cannot be brought to bear upon the
developing deformity. In a democraciy, the consumers of said
services may organize and public opinion may become articu-
late. Commissions are being set up, hearings take place, in-
vestigations are being carried through, handouts appear in the
press, the thing gets on the air, legislation is called for or passed
- all of which the organizations are loathe to see happen to
them. This process may take time, but it invariably works so
long as the relationships between profession and people, are
kept alive.
It is such a basis which is needed in the reform of the ex-
pert's opinions. The hand of the autonomous professional
organizations should be strengthened, but at the same time the
"people at large" should hear much more about the profes-
sional life, and whenever halled for, about committee hearings.
The political parties should not stop their occasional enquiries
into professional oiganizations and their supervision of the ex-
perts. In a country in which the law is essentially the pro-
claimed and articulate will of the people, the procedural rules
should be drawn in the light of the democratic atmosphere.
The Fees
The viewpoint of sociology becomes understandable against
the background of the particular civilization. 2' Let us apply
it to the problem of the fees. 22 The rule developed in antiquity
20The National Socialist and the Fascist states have been aware,
from the beginning, of the importance of professional organizations for
their purposes. Certain members were declared unworthy of belonging,
on account of race, liberal ideas, fight against National Socialism, etc.;
they were ejected. The right to elect the president and other officers, or
to set up any independent professional policies, were taken away. Every
professional organization got its fuehrer who according to the leadership
principle, nominated the officers. To the membership was left only the
right to pay the dues and to take cognizance of the decrees of the fuehrer.
A large -part of the post-graduate training was taken away for indoc-
trination in the new official teachings on race, etc. This, together with
the new policies of the iron fist, made the scientific search for truth
largely unnecessary and impossible, taking away the firm ground from
under the feet of the experts.
21Much more background delving is needed to understand a Sopho-
clean play than a modern one, which proves that our own background is
present in our minds, not that we need no background.22 Cf. the publications quoted in footnote 4 to p. 15, appearing on
p. 16. Cf. also H. L. Bomar, Jr., The Compensation of Expert Witnesses.
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. II, No. 4, 1935, p. 510. Cf. Also,
J. Jastrow, Freie Berufe und Gewerbesteuer (The Liberal Professions
and Trade Taxes) Munich, Duncker und Humblot, 1930.
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and taken up by the Church, that services and achievements of
a spiritual order should not be paid for but that what is neces-
sary for a decent life must be tendered by society to, its serv-
ants, is not entirely eliminated in our own time. That much
is clear! It has not proven feasible to keep the professional
groups aloof from the mechanisms and motives of industrial,
democratic, competitive civilization. Against this background,
the r6les or rules of the game have been written. The free
lance professional may sell his services to the highest bidder -
if he can get high bids. Experience shows that less than one
per thousand members of the professions are interested in keep-
ing up the absolute freedom of bargaining with the individual
client. There is on the other hand, the fee schedule, which is
the spine of every type of socialization of professional services.
No professional man and no client has ever been fully satisfied
with the principle of the fee schedule which consists in com-
puting conventional measures such as pieces of time or space,
or 'cuts' of performance. 23  The professional man may feel
that in that one moment when the diagnosis or basic idea dawns
on him, he does more for the client than the employee who
spends eight hours and gets paid for eight hours. The pro-
fessional man knows that such achievements in seconds are
possible only because of his years of patient work, training, and
abnegation. The client knows all this, too. In other words,
there is a factor of accountability introduced into the profes-
sions which is strange in itself to the typical and best the pro-
fessions have to offer. The patient and the client feel that
theirs is an individual case, no matter how much it may resem-
ble the neighbor's predicament. And with their feeling there
dovetails the conviction in all service-rendering and counselling
professions that there won't be repeats no matter how often
you spin it. How then, could this be paid for according to fee
schedules?
There is, thirdly a middle way, which is the legal terminol-
ogy is expressed in such words as decent fee, reasonable fee,
etc. The viewpoints of decency and reasonableness refer not
only to the amounts paid, but also the ways of reaching the con-
sumers. Certain actions are illicit by law, among them adver-
tising in the business way and fee splitting. This is not ridic-
ulous, prejudicial, absurd, and antiquated pettifoggery. These
forms are preserved in the interest of the clients, who, it is felt,
see the professional man not only on account of his skill but
also because they want to confide in him. Such terms as de-
23 In a fee schedule edited in 1933 for the advertising men in Ger-
many general functions, like drawing up of general plans, etc., were
rated higher than special items. In other words, the position of the
family doctor in advertising was strengthened. The older professions
should not be loath to learn from developments in the younger ones.
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scribed leave it to the discretionary powers what in a certain
civilization at a certain time is reasonable and decent, depend-
ing on how these services are estimated, how much they are in
demand, etc.24 This holds true for the expert, too. The law
does not directly prevent him from selling a specific skill for
the highest price to the party, although he is expected not to
sell out to the highest bidder. Society, in the interest of jus-
tice may demand that the extraordinarily skillful expert be
available at a reasonable fee, because it is generally supposed
that the expert primarily aids the process of justice by giving
his opinion,25 and witnesses, expert or lay, are duty-bound to
such help. It is along the same line that one argues that in a
criminal trial the defendant may be in no position to pay the
fees to which an extraordinarily skilled expert is entitled, but
obviously it is in the interest of justice that the financial posi-
tion of the defendant should make no difference. Where the
gist of the reform runs toward making the expert the compan-
ion of court and justice, any private compensation is, of course,
ruled out. But this solution, much as it seems to appeal at
present to the reformers, leads in its consequences to infringe-
ments upon the party principle in trial and such suggestions
should be thoroughly "cross examined."
Suggestions
Looking back to the century-old discussion of the expert
problem, to sad experiences and to hopeful, although often
somewhat convulsive, proposals one may sum up: Suggestions
for the improvement of the situation should follow the advice
that all legislators must take: that the reforms must grow from
the soil of present experiences and must be devised to meet the
present need or that of the immediate future. In other words,
there can be no absolute or metaphysical norm and law.
At present, the rules, procedural or otherwise, most urgently
needed, are the following:
REFERRING TO THE EXPERT:
The right of the parties to present experts must be preserved. The
court should prepare lists from which the parties may or may not choose
their experts. The fact that the expert was or was not so chosen should
be mentioned either at the beginning of the trial or when the jury is
charged.
The scientific and professional organizations should offer comprehensive
courses on scientific and legal aspects of rendering expert opinions.
The expert's oath should be administered solemnly. He should be ap-
pointed by the court for the case at hand. Counsel should be held in
contempt if he willfully attacks the honor or selfinterest of the expert.
24 The present author learned in Moscow, in 1931, that while the
monthly salary of a doctor in a state dispensary was 150 rubles, em-
ployees earning about the same amount were willing to spend as much
as fifty rubles for one visit with an old-time doctor to get a "real diag-
nosis and treatment."
25H. L. Bomar, Jr. L.c. p. 515.
W. ELIASBERG
The expert should be allowed to depose, i.e., to read or to narrate his
opinion, which should be prepared in writing if possible. On cross-
examination or re-direct, the expert may be asked hypothetical questions
which he may answer either in essay or yes-no, true-false form.,
The expert should be present when the witnesses are examined.
Counsel should be allowed to ask for the expert's opinion on the witness'
testimony. A discussion of the expert's opinion in connection with the
testimony of lay witnesses should be -possible. On the whole we are now
ready to liberalize the common law rules of evidence because we are
ready to forget the older fears of the incompetence of the layman juror
and to hold a new belief in the comman man. 26
The regulation of the expert's fees should be based on the idea that the
best experts should be available even to the poorest defendant. In other
words, there should be state and/or federal funds for this purpose.
REFERRING TO THE COURT AND THE JURORS:
The court and the jurors should rid themselves of the idea that there is
only one indivisible truth and that at best one, and at worst, none of the
experts, tells the truth. The task of the court and the jurors is to ex-
amine the expert's opinion logically, psychologically, and sociologically,
and to combine the different aspects, to find a reasonable truth.
The call for reforms will not stop, but what we need today is
a call for cross examination of the reformists' suggestions. That
sociology, together with the legal and other professional view-
points is called upon to help in such examination, has been
shown in this paper.
26 C. J. Friederich. The New Belief in the Common Man. Boston,
Little, Brown, 1942.
